Hacktivists didn’t disappear until the beginning of the decade. It has become more professional. In 2025, a variety of ideologically driven groups — some local, others quietly allied with states–are running large-scale disruption campaigns that are piggybacking elections, wars, and major events. The end result: lots of loud DDoS or defacements sometimes impact in real life and a media battleground enhanced by AI. What changed this year how it’s being handled, who’s involved, as well as how you can prepare.
Why 2025 is different from 2025?
1) The number of users is increasing, particularly within Europe. ENISA’s 2025 Threat Landscape illustrates hacktivism-related incidents throughout the EU and the world, with more than 80percent of reported incidents being attributable to hackers, mainly low-complexity DDoS. Only 2 percent caused material disruption to services. DDoS was the primary cause of disruption. majority of incidents reported overall.
2) State-aligned “faketivists.” Several campaigns mirror government objectives–particularly around Russia’s war on Ukraine and Middle-East flashpoints–blurring lines between volunteers, criminals, and state operators. Microsoft’s most recent analysis also links the growing surge of Russian actions to a wider multi-faceted campaign to thwart NATO countries.
3.) AI is amplifying the information warfare. Beyond packets and botnets, some groups are using AI to spread propaganda, deepfakes, as well as more phishing. This is part of a larger cybercriminal and nation-state trend that was documented this year.
4) Law enforcement is more aggressive. The pro-Russian DDoS collective NoName057(16) saw its infrastructure disrupted in a July, multi-country operation coordinated by Europol/Eurojust–proof that high-visibility hacktivism now draws coordinated takedowns.
What is hacktivism’s current look?
Playbook:
-
DDoS crowds through botnets that are rented or stolen along with “click-to-attack” panels; targets include transport companies, ministries power portals, as well as news websites.
-
Defacement of websites and leaks of data scheduled to news cycles to draw the greatest amount of attention.
-
Telegram-first Ops that include calls to victims listes, “ops of the day,” and leaderboards that are gamified to attract sympathizers.
-
The use of narrative technology using AI-assisted content, fake images along with “proof packs” to win the news cycle, even if the impact on technology is low.
Techniques and. the impact
The ENISA information is clear: the majority of hacktivist attacks have low-impact availability hit (Layer 3 volumetric flooding or Floods of HTTP Layer 7). But, some sectors such as finance continue to see targeted targeting (e.g. DDoS triggered by hacktivists being the most common sector-specific incidents reported in the report window).
The geopolitics that lie behind the keyboard
-
Russia-aligned groups (e.g., NoName057(16) and other ecosystems) focus on NATO/EU governments and transport as well as media, particularly in relation to summits and elections–before the disruption of infrastructure that occurred in July.
-
Spillovers from MENA in waves of operation during the Iran-Israel conflict led to ideologically framed campaigns and potential copycats.
-
“Anonymous Sudan” (subject of U.S. indictments in late 2024) exemplifies DDoS-for-impact wrapped in political branding–illustrative of groups mixing ideology, intimidation, and opportunism.
-
Large events are attraction points: starting with the 2024 Paris Olympics (after-action lessons are published at the beginning of the month of January) until 2025’s EU election, “mega-events” reliably attract hackers.
The layer of messaging is comprised of hashtags, memes and morale
Research that tracks more than 11,000 posts across 120plus groups exhibits typical patterns: pre-attack alerts to get the attention of others after the attack, following the attack “victory” reels even for small effects, and continuous hashtag campaigns that shift the narrative region-by-region. Be prepared for coordinated meme drop along with DDoS bursts.
Study of case studies for this season
-
The NoName057(16) takedown (July 2025): Law enforcement across a dozen nations have shut down a portion of the group’s infrastructure, and issued warrants, indicating that the volunteer DDoS “armies” are a security top priority.
-
Swarms of voters (2024-2025): EU institutions as well as national agencies were hit with low-grade DDoS attacks around ballots. Ireland’s websites were hit multiple times during the days leading up to voting (limited effect).
What does this mean for the defenders
1) Consider hacktivism an communications issue, not just it is a technical issue. Most attacks aim to make headlines and make headlines Be prepared to issue fast, precise status updates that shut down the oxygen to inflated assertions. (Have short, pre-approved templates.)
2) Engineer for graceful degradation:
-
Anycast DDoS mitigation by auto-scaling to the edge.
-
A shrewd caching strategy for public websites and static fallbacks in periods of high traffic.
-
Limiting the rate of Layer 7 security, bot/WAAP protections, as well as geo/ASN controls that you can switch quickly.
-
Runbooks to help you manage “under attack” modes in your CDN/WAF.
Back these by drills on the table that are tied to elections as well as geopolitical anniversaries or major launches.
3) Check the narrative surface: Monitor Telegram, X and copy websites for your domain or brand; examine claims prior to responding however, respond swiftly in the event that false stories are propagated.
4) Update Your “headlines” systems first: CMS, SSO, proxies, VPN concentrators and everything that is connected to the internet. CISA’s KEV adds evidence that shows active exploitation continues to move. Don’t offer hackers an easy way to deface your system or credential re-use tale.
5) Do not overlook an AI perspective: Assume deepfaked screenshots as well as cloned voices and false “leak” PDFs. Create internal verification and an unifying reliable source for the press and customers.
6.) Co-ordinate with the authorities In the EU and you’re in the NIS2-era, be aware of expectations regarding incident management and reporting and reporting; if you’re a government institution or critical service you should pre-wire contact to national CSIRTs. (ENISA’s 2025-based landscape lays out the governance requirements.)
A 30-day anti-hacktivism race (practical and achievable)
Week 1 – Baseline & playbooks
-
Choose your top five publicly accessible URLs/APIs, and set caching/TTL as well as rate-limits.
-
Stages prior to “under attack” toggles in your CDN/WAF. You must note who is able to turn these toggles.
-
The draft three templates for public use including service status, mitigation of DDoS being worked on, false-claim counter. (Legal and PR signature-off is now.)
Week 2 – Controls & monitoring
-
Make bot management available, TLS termination at the edge, and enforce strict rules for origin.
-
Join your sector’s ISAC feed, and create alerts for your brand or domain in Telegram/X’s paste mirrors.
Week 3 – Drill
-
Simulate a 2-hour Layer 7 surge during high hours of business. Test the latency of pages as well as error budgets and SLAs for communications.
Week 4 – Harden & measure
-
Repair The “front door” stack; change tokens/keys, verify backup restore for web-based levels.
-
Make an internal after-action note and fix the bottleneck with the longest duration first.
The most important thing is the bottom line
2025’s hacktivism wave of 2025 is quick, loud as well-versed in media. The majority of campaigns won’t bring your technical slack, but they could nevertheless undermine trust and take the spotlight. Develop strategies to build resilience and practice crisis communication and observe closely the story as closely as you do your logs. If you do all three things properly you’ll be able to deprive hackers of the source they’re most in need of attention.
